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DETERMINANTS OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT: 
IRRIGATION IN INDONESIA 
M.W. Rosegrant1) and Effendi Pasandamn2) 
Abstrak 
Akwnulasi kapital publik dan swasta merupakan faktor utama dalam pertumbuhan ekonomi 
Tulisan ini mengtgi faktor-faktor penentu perilaku investasi publik dengan menggunakan contoh 
investasi irigasi pemerintah di Indonesia. Dalam hal ini pemerintah Indonesia bertindak sebagai 
perencana sosial, memaksimalkan keuntungan sosial dalam mengalokasikan sumberdaya untuk 
investasi irigasi dengan kendala sumberdaya yang terbatas. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The rate of accumulation of public and private capital is a key factor in 
economic growth. A number of studies have examined the determinants of private 
investment in developing countries, but with the exception of early work by Hayami 
and Kikuchi (1978), there has been little systematic analysis of the determinants of 
public investment, which accounts for a large share of capital formation. Analysis 
of private investment behavior have treated public investment as exogenously 
determined, and have examined whether public investment affects private 
investment positively, by reducing private costs of investment or increasing the 
productivity of private investment; or negatively, by crowding out private 
investment (Gandhi, 1990; Tun Wai and Wong, 1982; Sundarajan and Thakur, 
1980). Irrigation investment accounted for more than one-half of public 
expenditures in agriculture in the 1980s, and publicly-funded irrigation accounts 
for 85 percent of irrigated area and 75 percent of rice production in Indonesia 
(Sudaryanto, et al., 1992; Rosegrant, et al., 1987). 
Annual irrigation development expenditures and area completed by type of 
investment, 1969/70to 1993/94,areshowninAppendixFigures 1 and2. Theannual 
data are summarized by five-year development plan (Repelita) in Appendix Tables 
1 and 2. The government irrigation budget is divided into four main categories: (1) 
new irrigation construction, which includes investment in new reservoir and 
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diversion irrigation systems; (2) rehabilitation of existing irrigation systems; (3) 
swamp and tidal irrigation, which are small systems with relatively few water 
control structures that rely on natural flooding or tidal movement for water; and ( 4) 
river and flood control. As shown in the figures and tables, the irrigation investment 
program grew dramatically during the first three Repelitas. Real expenditures in 
the third plan were more than four times larger than in the first plan. However, 
expenditures declined by almost 20 percent between Repel ita ill and Repelita IV. 
During Repel ita V, the expenditures were 65 percent higher then those of Repelita 
IV. 
Although declining in relative importance, rehabilitation expenditures 
increased substantially in absolute terms through the third plan, but dropped by 32 
percent in the fourth plan. In the last plan, however the rehabilitation expenditures 
increased by 52 percent. Over the course of the first three plans, expenditures on 
construction of new irrigation systems increased rapidly and received the largest 
aggregate share of expenditures, averaging 38 percent of expenditures during the 
first three Repelitas. Real expenditures on new construction increased nearly 
ten-fold between the first and third plans, before declining by 12 percent in the 
fourth plan. The swamp and tidal irrigation development program, which received 
nearly 30 percent of expenditures in the first Repelita, has declined in relative 
importance to about 5 percent, but received a nearly constant level of expenditures 
through the first three plans. Like the other programs, swamp and tidal irrigation 
investment declined sharply in the fourth plan, by 31 percent. After a small initial 
program, river and flood control received about 30 percent of expenditures over the 
last three plans, with a decline in expenditure of over 9 percent in the third plan and 
an increase by 75 percent in the fmal period. 
The completion of physical areas by type of development over the first four 
Repelitas is shown in Appendix Table 2. Area rehabilitated totaled 950,000 hectare 
in the first plan, and declined steadily thereafter to 150,000 in the third Repelita. 
The rehabilitation, however, expanded to 1,165,000 hectare in the last Repelita. 
Completions of new irrigated are more than doubled between the first and third 
plans, to 436,000 hectare, before declining to 180,000 hectare in the fourth plan and 
increasing to 427,000 hectare in the fifth plan. Swamp and tidal irrigation peaked 
at 450,000 hectare completed in the third plan. Area brought under river and flood 
control in the fifth plan were 78 percent higher than the totals in the fourth plan. 
A number of factors have been hypothesized to cause the large reduction in 
the irrigation investment program in the fourth plan, including declining oil prices 
and a slowdown in growth in gross national product (both of which reduce 
government revenue); and declining world rice prices and increasing costs per 
hectare of irrigation investment, which reduce the social profitability of investment 
in irrigation (Rosegrant, et al., 1987). 
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Do governments act as rational social planners, allocating public resources 
so as to maximize net social returns?. 1his question is explored in this paper, which 
analyzes public investment behavior in irrigation in Indonesia using a behavioral 
model adapted from MWldlak (1988), which in tum is a variant on Jorgenson's 
(1967, 1971) neoclassical investment model. 
METHODOLOGY 
Theoretical Investment Model 
The model of public investment behavior is based on the assumption that the 
government acts to maximize net social returns- over time. First, define the 
multi-period net returns to investment: 
Rt = PtFt (Vt, Kt)- Wi:Vt- qt (Kt + g.Kt) (1) 
where the output of the investment is represented by a production fimction F(v,K), 
vis a vector of variable inputs and K is the vector of capital, pis the output price, 
w is the vector of input prices, q is the vector of prices of capital, K is the time 
derivative of capital K, g is the rate of depreciation, and t denotes the time period. 
The decision is formulated as an intertemporal optimization problem in 
which the government selects the time path of investment that maximizes the 
expected present value of the stream of net returns Rt. If r is the discoWlt factor and 
vt and Kt are the variable and capital input allocations, the problems is to 
Maximized Eoo o:-rl R (t) dlj 
(K(t),\1(1)) 
(2) 
subject to the initial condition K(O) = Ko and the transversality condition lim 
[e-11 R (t)] = 0. Eo(X) is the expected value of X conditional on the information set at 
t=O. Assuming certainty equivalence and an interior solution, first order conditions 
for vt indicate that along the optimal path, the quantity of input allocated to each 
technique at t does not affect revenues in subsequent periods. Consequently, the 
problem can be solved recursively; the first step is to determine optimal input levels 
vt*=v(st), where st = {pt, wt, Kt}, the vector of state variables. Because of the 
recursive nature of the problem, the first stage solution for vt is determined using 
standard single period-profit maximization procedures equating each input's value 
marginal product to its real price in each period. 
Longer run investment decisions are determined in the second stage of the 
optimization by choosing Kt to maximize: 
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00 
Eo [J e-n (1t (s)- q(K + g.K))dt] 
0 
(3) 
were 1t( s) = PtFt- Wtvt*, subject to the constraints of (2) and conditioned on the first stage solution 
for variable inputs. Suppressing it's dependence on s and t, the Euler equation for this problem is: 
an 
- - q(r +g) - q = 0 
81t 
(4) 
time derivative of q. This equation states that, at optimal capital levels, 
marginal productivity of capital is equal to user cost. Solving ( 4) gives the optimal 
* time path of capital K =K(z), where z={s, r, q, q, g), the relevant exogenous state 
variables for the investment decisions. Optimal or desired demand for investment 
is the difference between the optimal level of capital and that currently available: 
* * I (z) = (K -K) (5) 
Determination of Actual Investment 
The framework described above derives the optimal or desired capital stock 
as a fimction of the specified stateyariables. The actual stock capital, however, does 
not in general adjust instantaneously to changes in the desired stock. Instead, 
changes in desired capital are transformed into actual investment through a partial 
adjustment process (McGuirk and Mundlak, 1991; Gandhi, 1990; Clark, 1979; 
Jorgenson, 1971; Koyck, 1954). 
In the partial adjustment model of investment, it is assumed that capital is 
adjusted toward its desired level by a constant proportion of the difference between 
desired and actual capital, or more generally, as a weighted average of past levels 
of desired capital. Using the same notation as above, but restoring the time 
subscripts, a general partial adjustment model can be defined as follows: 
(Kt- Kt-1) = j(at) (Kt- Kt-1) (6) 
or 
It =j(at) lt*(z) (7) 
Where It is actual investment, and F(at) is a function representing the adjustment 
process in moving from desired levels of capital stock to actual levels of capital 
stock. 
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A number of theories have been advanced to explain the partial adjustment 
model of investment. Eisner and Strotz (1963) first suggested a theory based on the 
internal costs of adjustment to the firm. In this theory, firms pay a penalty for having 
a capital stock different from the desired level, and incur adjustment costs in 
attempting to move to that level. The actual investment is that which minimizes the 
total costs in the trade-off between having less or more than desired investment and 
the costs of adjustment (Clark, 1979). Internal adjustment costs include the physical 
lags in the planning and implementation of desired capital investment. 
McGuirk and Mundlak (1991, 1992) and Gandhi (1990}, on the other hand, 
stress the importance of external adjustment costs such as the availability of 
resources to the firm or to the government. External resource constraints may be 
important for both public investment, which relies on tax and other revenues to 
finance new investment, and for private firms. In developing countries, in particular, 
the availability ofloanable funds may not be fully reflected in the interest rate. With 
imperfect capital markets, loanable financial resources may be rationed at 
prevailing interest rates. 
The model utilized here decomposes the adjustment costs f( a.t) into the 
internal costs and the external costs or resource constraints. The internal costs of 
adjustment, which induce physical lags in implementation of desired investment, 
are represented by a distributed lag operator. The distributed lag process describes 
the structure and period of the transformation of desired investment into actual 
investment. 
This process of implementing desired investment, however, is also 
conditioned on the availability of external resources. The impact of external 
resource constraints on actual investment take place within the same period, and 
are assumed to be proportional to the desired or optimal level of new investment 
(Gandhi, 1990; Blejer and Kahn, 1984; Coen, 1968). Thus, 
(8) 
where the Ci are the resource constraints and L[·] is a distributed lag operator such 
that 
n 
L[Xi(z)] =L Ps Zt- s The resource constraints can include variables 
s=O 
such as gross national product or government revenues, if the decision maker is the 
government; or commercial bank credit to agriculture and rural savings, if the farm 
is the decision maker. 
Substituting equation (8} into (7) provides the relationship between actual 
and desired investment: 
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n 
It= L. a;C;+ L f3s Zt-s 
I 
(9) 
s=O 
The model thus states that actual investment is a function of the availability 
of financial resources, and ofthe lagged values ofthe exogenous determinants of 
desired investment. 
Empirical Specification 
Foi the empirical estimation of the determinants of irrigation investment in 
Indonesia, investment is disagregated intothefourmain categories of new irrigation 
construction, rehabilitation, swamp and tidal irrigation, and river and flood control. 
Investment functions are estimated for total irrigation investment and by type of 
investment. As implied in the theoretical model of public investment behavior, 
investment in each type of irrigation is estimated as a function of the net profits 
generated by the investment relative to net profits of other sectors, the costs of 
investment in irrigation, and the availability of public resources for investment. The 
investment model is estimated using two alternative definitions of profitability of 
irrigation. The measures of profitability of investment in irrigation are based on the 
relative profitability of rice production, which accounts for aver 80 percent of 
irrigated area. The alternative definitions of profitability used are the world price 
of rice deflated by the manufacturing unit value index; and net rice revenues per 
hectare (world rice price times rice yield per hectare less fertilizer and labor costs 
per hectare) deflated by the index of value added per capita in the non-agricultural 
sector. The latter measure is a proxy for the profitability of resources utilized in the 
non- agricultural sector. 
For the total investment function, the cost measure is the area- weighted real 
average cost per hectare across the four types of irrigation development, while the 
investment functions by type of investment utilize the real cost per hectare for each 
type of irrigation development. The proxy variables for the availability of public 
resources are the real gross national product per capita; and the real world price of 
oil. The latter variables is included because of its large impact on government 
revenues, and on availability of foreign exchange. The model is specified in general 
form as follows: 
n 
IRREXPit = <IiO +<Iii GNPCt + <Ii2 POILt + L f3is WPRJCEt-s 
s=O 
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n 
+ ,L 9 is COSTHAi,t-s + Jlt (10) 
s=O 
where IRREXPi is the expenditures on irrigation of type i, GNPC is the per capita 
gross national product,POJListhe real world price of oil, WPRICEis the real world 
price of rice, COSTHAi is the real cost per hectare of irrigation development of type 
i, and 9t is the stochastic error term. Alternatively, REVRICE, the net rice revenue 
per hectare deflated by the index of value added per capita in the non-agricultural 
sector, is utilized in place ofWPRICE as the measure of returns to irrigation. 
The general form of the distributed lag cannot be effectively estimated 
because of the loss of degrees of freedom and multicollinearity between the price 
and cost variables in time t and the lagged values of these variables. In order to 
make the problems tractable, a structure is imposed on the distributed lag based on 
the construction process of irrigation projects. 
The actual specification of the lag structure is an empirical question. Among 
the lag structures widely used in the literature are rational, Koyck, and polynomial 
distributed lags. In the analysis here, the lag structure can be determined based on 
observation of the actual physical implementation process for irrigation systems. 
The lag process in irrigation construction suggests a polynomial distributed lag of 
degree two. Lags in the irrigation development process include lags between project 
appraisal and approval, between approval and initiation of construction, and 
between initiation and completion (Svendson and Ramirez, 1990). As a result of 
this process, expenditures on a project generally follow a quadratic polynomial 
distribution, with relatively small but increasing expenditures in the early years; 
large expenditures in the middle years of construction, as the headworks and main 
canals are constructed; and then declining expenditures as secondary and tertiary 
canals are completed (Appendix Figure 3). In order to estimate investment models 
consistent with the stylized facts of the irrigation Construction process, the./Jis and 
9is in equation ( 1 0) are therefore restricted to be on a polynomial of degree two and 
length n. Suppressing the subscript i for type of irrigation for clarity of presentation. 
.Ps = bo + b 1 s + b2 S2, s = 1, ... , n 
9 =CO+ C] S + C2 S2, S = J, ... , n 
Substituting (11) and (12) into equation (10) gives 
(11) 
(12) 
n 
IRREXP = a.o + at GNPCt + a.2 POILt_L (bo+bts+b2S2) 
s=O 
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or 
WPRJCEt-s +i, (Co+cis+c2.S2) COSTHAt-s +11 t (13) 
s=O 
IRREXP = ao +<XI GNPCt + a2 POILt + bo ZWPRICEcx 
b1 ZWPRICEit + b2 ZWPRICE2t +co ZCOSTHAOt 
+ c1 ZCOSTHAu + c2 ZCOSTHA2t + t (14) 
where 
n 
ZWPRICEOt = L WPRICEt-s ; 
s=O 
n 
ZWPRICEu = L s WPRICEt-s ; 
•=0 
n 
ZWPRICE2t = L i WPRICEt-s ; 
s=O 
n 
ZCOSTHAOt =L COSTHAt-s ; 
•=0 
n 
ZCOSTHAu = L s WPRICEt-s; 
n 
ZCOSTHA2t = L 
s=O 
2 s . s CO THAt-s, 
Thus, irrigation expenditures (IRREXPt) are estimated as a function of the 
constructed variables ZWPRICEjt and ZCOSHTAjt and the resulting estimates of bj 
and Cj are utilized in equations (11) and (12) to compute estimates offls and 9s. 
Lags in irrigation construction vary from project to project depending upon 
the size and type of the project, location, and efficiency of the construction process. 
The final step in specification of the empirical model is determination of the length 
of the lag. Use ofF-Tests for goodness-of-fit introducer a substantial upward bias 
in lag length (Maddala, 1988). The Schwarz posterior probability criterion for 
model selection is therefore utilized instead of the F-test. The Schwarz criterion 
incorporates both a measure of precision of the estimates and a measure of 
parsimony in model parameterization and therefore eliminates the upward bias in 
choosing the lag length (Ramanathan, 1989; Judge, eta/., 1980). Based on the 
Schwarz criterion, a lag length of five years is utilized for rice price and revenue in 
the total investment, new irrigation construction, rehabilitation, and river and flood 
control investment equations, and a three year lag length is used in the swamp and 
tidal investment equation. For the capital cost variable, a five-year lag·is utilized in 
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the swamp and tidal irrigation investment equation, and six years in all other 
equations. 
Data and Estimation Procedures 
The variables utilized in the various specifications of the regression model 
are defmed in Appendix Table 3. The sources for the basic data are as follows: (a) 
Directorate General for Water Resource Development (DGWRD), Ministry of 
Public Works for real annual expenditures on new irrigation construction and real 
capital costs per hectare for irrigation development; (b) Central Bureau of Statistics 
(CBS) for real gross national product, net revenue per hectare for rice, and the index 
of value added per capita in the non-agricultural sector; (c) the World Bank for the 
real world price of rice and the real world price of oil. The data covers the period 
1964-1988. 
All estimated equations showed statistically significant serial correlation. 
Estimation of the total investment equation was therefore undertaken using 
generalized least squares with correction for serial correlation. The set of equations 
by type of investment were estimated as a system, using Zellner's generalized least 
squares estimator for seemingly unrelated regressions, with correction for serial 
correlation. In each equation, rho was estimated using the maximum likelihood 
estimator suggested by Beach and MacKinnon (1978). 
PUBLIC INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR 
The estimated equations for the price and revenue models are presented in 
Tables 1-2, and the estimated elasticities of irrigation investment with respect to 
the exogenous variables computed from these equations are shown in Tables 3-4. 
The results are in general excellent, and confirm the strong impact of relative 
profitability and resource financial constraints on public investment in irrigation in 
Indonesia. The signs of the estimated parameters are in most cases as predicted by 
the theoretical model and highly significant, and the K range from 0.48 to 0.98 
(Tables 1-2). There is little to choose from between the price and revenue models: 
the goodness-of-fit is virtually the same, and the estimated elasticities are similar. 
While the results overall strongly support the hypothesized effects, the results that 
differ from prior expectations also provide interesting insights. 
For example, for the swamp and tidal irrigation equation under both price 
and revenue formulations, most of the signs of the estimated parameters and the 
long term elasticities are unexpected (Tables 1 and 2). Per capita GNP, price of oil, 
price of rice, and rice revenue all have negative long term effects on swamp and 
tidal irrigation investment. A possible explanation for these results is that 
investment in swamp and tidal irrigation is guided more by social welfare goals 
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other than by maximization of social returns. Swamp and tidal irrigation 
investments have been undertaken mainly in conjunction with the "transmigration" 
program). which seeks to relocate rural families from the densely populated island 
of Java" to other islands. The government may be operating so as to maintain 
incentives for transmigrants by increasing swamp and tidal irrigation expenditure 
levels as compensation during periods of declining rice prices or income levels. 
The equations for total irrigation, new irrigation, rehabilitation, and river and 
flood control all show positive effects on investment in time t of an increase in the 
cost per hectare of irrigation during time periods t and/or t-1 (Tables 1 and 2). This 
relationship seems counterintuitive, but is in fact plausible. An increase in the cost 
per unit of investment will have two effects: first, the increased unit cost of new 
projects will be reflected also in an increased per unit cost of on-going projects, 
which will have the effect of increasing the total expenditures in the on-going 
portfolio of construction; second, as predicted in the model, there will be an induced 
shift out of irrigation and into more profitable investments. The positive impact of 
cost increases on expenditures in the initial years indicates that the first effect is 
dominant in those years. In the long run, though, the relative profitability effect 
dominates (Table 3 and 4). 
The negative effect of price in period ton investment in period tin several 
of the equations is likely explained by the tendency that, in the short run, a price 
increase will cause diversion of government expenditures from investment to 
consumption expenditures. Due to the political importance of stable rice prices, the 
immediate response of the Indonesian government to a rice price increase may be 
to divert funds from irrigation and other long term investments to the financing of 
rice imports to relieve short term price pressure. In the longer run, the expected 
positive impact ofthe price increase on investments dominates for total irrigation 
and new irrigation construction, but the diversion-of-funds effect dominates for 
rehabilitation. 
The elasticities of irrigation investment with respect to per capita GNP range 
from 2.00 to 3.11 for total irrigation, new irrigation construction, and rehabilitation, 
and 4.81-6.45 for river and flood control. While the elasticities are large, they do 
not seem excessive, since a small percentage change in per capita GNP generates 
large shifts in government revenues relative to irrigation expenditures. The impact 
of the world price of oil on irrigation investments is also substantial: with the 
exception of the negative elasticity for swamp and tidal irrigation (see above), the 
investment elasticities with respecttothepriceofoil range from 0.38to 0.79 (Tables 
3-4) for the different types of irrigation. 
The long run elasticity of response for new irrigation construction, river and 
flood control, and total irrigation investment to world prices are 1.00, 4.03, and 
1.04, respectively (Table 3). The price elasticities are negative for rehabilitation 
andswamp and tidal irrigation, as discussed above. The investment elasticities with 
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Table 1. Parameter estimates for irrigation investment equations, price model, 
t-values in parentheses 
Parameter Estimates for hrigation Investment Eqwtions 
Total hrigatim 
New hrigatim Rehabilitatim 
Swamp/Tidal River & Flood 
Construction hrigatim Control 
CONSTANT 1320012.99 -478502.46 -67545.23 258407.70 -1254570.77 
(-2.36) (-2.45) (-0.43) (8.10) (-15.80) 
GNPC 3533.64 1397.60 864.73 -251.18 2205.83 
(5.27) (2.94) (3.04) (-5.44) (5.92) 
POlL 13793.62 5652.64 7260.70 -350.o7 3181.07 
(7.56) (3.69) (5.79) (-0.98) (2.33) 
WPRICE 
( 0) -136.70 -59.18 -138.99 -23.95 89.08 
(-2.06) (-1.12) (-5.14) (-1.44) (2.23) 
(-1) 165.16 52.87 . -69.75 23.67 212.10 
(3.27) (1.24) (-3.37) (3.56) (7.01) 
(-2) 342.27 118.02 -16.37 20.95 276.26 
(7.83) (3.02) (-0.89) (3.16) (10.60) 
(-3) 394.63 136.25 21.16 -32.13 281.55 
(9.69) (3.81) (1.16) (-2.28) (11.71) 
(-4) 322.25 107.58 42.83 228.00 
(7.90) (3.29) (2.22) (9.70) 
(-5) 125.12 32.01 48.65 115.57 
(2.49) (0.83) (2.05) (4.09) 
COSTIIA 
( 0) 1459.27 43.33 9.95 -2.74 50.11 
(8.39) (3.12) (1.07) (-0.80) (4.80) 
(-1) 234.67 10.24 -9.13 -3.32 -4.14 
(2.04) (0.97) (-1.53) (-1.68) (-0.64) 
(-2) -605.35 -14.04 -22.18 -5.00 -37.17 
(-4.92) (-1.30) (-3.52) (- 1.86) (-4.98) 
(-3) 1060.80 -29.53 -29.21 -7.80 -48.99 
(-8.48 (-2.73) (-4.96) (- 3.15) (-6.92) 
(-4) -1132.67 -36.20 -30.20 -11.70 -39.59 
(-11.54) (-3.93) (-8.08) (-4.31) (-6.92) 
(-5) -817.97 -34.08 -25.17 -16.72 -8.98 
(-9.88) (-4.51) (-4.64) (- 2.63) (-1.51) 
(-6) -119.70 -23.15 -14.12 42.85 
R2 (predicted/ 
(-0.67) (1.98) (-1.02) (- 3.04) 
0.98 0.92 0.93 0.85 0.95 
observed) 
Iho -0.58 -0.15 -0.63 -0.73 -0.45 
respect to revenues are similar to the price elasticities: 1.02, 3.31, and 0.83 for new 
construction, river and flood control, and total irrigation investment, respectively; 
and negative for the other two types of irrigation (Table 4). 
Finally, the long run elasticities of investment with respect to the capital costs 
of irrigation are negative for all types of irrigation, in either model specification. 
The elasticity of total investment with respect to capital cost is -1.04 in the price 
model and -1.05 in the revenue model, and ranges from -0.70 to -1.93 for different 
types of irrigation and different models (Table 3-4). 
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Table 2. Parameter estimates for irrigation investment equations, revenue 
model, t-values in parentheses 
Parameter Estimates for Irrigatiw Investment Equatiws 
Total Irrigltioo New Irrigatiw Rehabilitaion Swamplfidal River&Flood Constructioo Irrigltioo Centro! 
CONSTANT -936640.00 -401970.00 1498.76 263604.60 -965035.68 
(-6.17) (-3.14) (0.03) (8.58) (9.92) 
GNPC 2698.70 1052.30 906.81 -259.45 1644.33 
(2.92) (2.00) (2.55) (-4.94) (3.11) 
POll- 15177.00 5813.30 7709.85 -293.38 3577.22 
(6.32) (3.16) 
WPRICE 
(5.47) (-0.72) (1.98) 
( 0) 
-270.49 
-87.71 -197.61 -36.85 22.50 
(-2.60) (-1.22) (-5.33) (-1.52) (0.35) 
(-1) 131.83 60.97 -120.78 27.91 207.57 
(1.62) (1.01) (-4.14) (2.72) (4.17) 
(-2) 377.26 149.64 -57.93 26.13 311.62 
(5.32) (2.60) (-2.19) (2.89) (7.16) 
(-3) 465.80 180.29 -9.05 -42.20 334.65 
(7.10) (3.39) (-0.35) (-2.22) (8.39) 
(-4) 397.45 152.92 25.85 276.65 
(6.08) (3.20) (0.93) (7.17) 
(-5) 172.21 67.53 46.77 137.65 
(2.14) (1.25) (1.35) (2.96) 
COSTHA 
( 0) 1595.30 49.67 -1.82 -2.64 66.11 
(6.60) (2.92) (-0.15) (-0.74) (4.33) (-!) 362.47 17.02 -9.98 -3.70 4.52 
(2.13) (1.20) (-1.40) (-1.72) (0.48) (-2) 
-508.76 -7.86 -16.86 -5.52 -34.72 
(-3.20) (0.63) (-2.68) (-1.92) (-3.81) (-3) 
-1018.41 
-25.03 -22.48 -8.11 -51.59 
(-6.89) (-2.15) (-3.95) (-3.15) (-5.81) (-4) 
-1116.33 
-34.44 -26.82 -11.46 -46.11 
(-10.81) (-3.71) (-7.85) (-3.98) (-7.14) (-5) 952.68 
-36.09 -29.89 -15.57 -18.26 
(11.29) (-5.12) (-5.54) (-2.25) (-2.67) 
(-6) -377.39 -29.99 -31.69 31.94 
R2 (predicted/ 
(-1.88) (2.60) (2.21) (1.92) 
0.97 0.91 0.92 0.84 0.93 
observed) 
Iho 
-0.50 -0.11 -0.58 -0.70 
-0.36 
Table 3. Elasticity of irrigation investment with respect to GNP per capita, the 
world price of oil, the world price of rice, and capital cost per hectare 
of irrigation (price model) 
Parameter Estimates for Irrigatirn Investment Equatirns, By Type of Investmwt 
Total Irri :tion New Irrig~rn Rehabilitatirn Swamplfidal River & Flood g Crnstructlon Irrigation Cootrol 
CONSTANT 2.61 3.11 2.15 -1.57 6.45 
ron.. 0.42 0.52 0.74 -0.09 0.38 
WPRICE, Long Run 1.04 1.00 -0.33 -0.08 4.03 
WPRICE 
( 0) -0.12 -0.15 -0.40 -0.17 0.30 
(-1) 0.14 0.14 -0.20 0.17 0.72 
(-2) 0.29 0.30 -0.05 0.15 0.93 
(-3) 0.34 0.35 0.06 -0.23 0.92 
(-4) 0.28 0.28 0.12 0.77 
(-5) 0.11 0.08 0.14 0.39 
COSTHA, Long Run -1.04 -1.35 -1.68 -1.75 -0.70 
COSTHA 
( 0) 0.74 0.69 0.14 -0.10 0.77 
(-1) 0.12 0.16 -0.13 -0.12 -0.06 
(-2) -0.31 -0.23 -0.31 -0.19 -0.57 
(-3) -0.54 -0.47 -0.41 -0.29 -0.75 
(-4) -0.58 -0.58 -0.42 -0.43 -0.61 
(-5) -0.42 -0.55 0.35 -0.62 -0.14 
(-6) -0.06 -0.37 -0.20 0.66 
Table 4. Elasticity of irrigation investment with respect to GNP per capita, the 
world price of oil, the net revenue per hectare of rice, and capital cost 
per hectare (revenue model) 
Parameter Estimates for Irrigat.im Investment Equatims, By Type of Investment 
Total New Irrigat.im Rehabilitatim Swampll'idal River & Flood Irrigation Cmstruction Irrigltion Control 
CONSTANT 2.00 2.34 2.26 -1.62 4.81 
POlL 0.46 0.53 0.79 -0.08 0.43 
REVRICE, Long Run 1.02 0.83 -0.68 -0.14 3.31 
REVRICE 
( 0) 
-0.18 -0.17 -0.43 -0.20 0.06 
(-1) 0.09 0.12 -0.26 0.15 0.53 
(-2) 0.25 0.29 -0.13 0.14 0.80 
(-3) 0.30 0.35 -0.02 -0.23 0.86 
(-4) 0.26 0.30 0.06 0.71 
(-5) 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.35 
COSTHA, Long Run 
-1.05 -1.07 -1.93 -1.74 -0.74 
COSTHA 
( 0) 0.81 0.80 -0.03 -0.10 1.01 
(-1) 0.18 0.27 -0.14 -0.14 0.07 (-2) 
-0.26 -0.13 -0.23 -0.20 -0.53 
(-3) 
-0.52 -0.40 -0.31 -0.30 -0.79 
(-4) 
-0.59 -0.55 -0.37 -0.42 -0.71 
(-5) 
-0.48 -0.58 -0.42 -0.58 -0.28 (-6) 
-0.19 -0.48 -0.43 0.49 
CONCLUSIONS 
Desired in vestment in irrigation is a function of the profitability of investment 
in irrigation relative to other investments, and actual investment adjusts over time 
to desired levels, conditioned on the external costs of adjustment represented by 
financial resource constraints, and the internal costs of adjustment, which induce 
physical lags in the implementation of desired investment. 
The results are consistent with the hypothesis that the Indonesian government 
acts as a social planner, maximizing net social benefits in the allocation of resources 
to irrigation investment subject to resource constraints. The government is highly 
responsive to both economic incentives and resource constraints in determining 
investment levels. The long run elasticities of response of total irrigation 
investment and new irrigation construction with respect to world rice prices are 
about 1.00, and with respect to capital costs of irrigation are -1.04 to -1.35. 
Therelativelylonglagsestimatedhereininvestmentresponsetopricesimply 
gradual adjustments in investment to changing prices over time. Included in the 
adjustments is the recent policy to transfer the responsibility of land development 
from the Ministry of Agriculture to the Ministry of Public Works. It is expected 
that such a policy will speed up the investment response to changing prices. At any 
given point in time, the investment level is in effect a function of long run average 
rice price and average capital costs per hectare, conditioned on availability of 
resources. The relatively gradual long term adjustment process will tend to dampen 
the cyclical effects arising from investment response to changing rice prices. 
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Appendix Table 1. Real irrigation development expenditure, Indonesia, by type 
of development, Repelita I through Repelita V, 1975n6 
prices 
Repelita I Repelita II Repelita III Repelita IV Repelita V 
Type ofDevelopment 1969-73 1974-78 1979-83 1984-88 1989-93 
----------------billionRp--------------
Rehabilitation 
New construction 
Swamp/tidal 
River and flood 
control 
73.7 
38.3 
150.0 
9.9 
Source: Ministry «Public WOiks, DGWRD. 
138.8 
185.7 
50.1 
207.8 
263.4 
358.0 
54.6 
237.2 
179.5 
315.5 
37.6 
215.6 
272.4 
515.1 
69.7 
377.6 
Appendix Table 2. Physical area completed, Indonesia, by type of 
development, Repelita I through Repelita V 
Type of Repelitai Repelitall Repelita III RepelitaiV Repelita V 
Development 1969-73 1974-78 1979-83 1984-88 1989-93 
billionRp 
Rehabilitation 953.5 527.8 394.7 151.7 1165.3 
New construction 191.2 325.9 436.2 197.9 426.5 
Swamp/tidal*> 178.7 179.2 454.5 120.3 395.1 
River and flood 289.4 613.7 578.5 256.0 454.6 
control 
Ntt: *)Not included data« 1992. 
Source: Ministry «Public Work, DGWRD. 
Appendix Table 3. Definition of variables for estimation of irrigation 
investment functions. All variables are on an annual basis, 
1964-1988. 
Variable Definition 
IRREXPi Real expenditures on new irrigation construction, thousand US$, 1985 
prices, by type of investment. 
WPRICE Real world rice price, Thai 5% broken, FOB Bangkok, US$/mt, 1985 prices. 
COSTHA Real capital costs per ha for new irrigation construction, thousand US$/ha, 
1985 prices. 
POlL Real price of oil, Saudi Arabian OPEC Market Crude, US$/barrel, 1985 
prices. 
GNPC Gross national product per capita, US$, 1985 prices. 
REVRICE Net rice revenue deflated by the index of value added per capita in the 
non-agricultural sector. 
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Appendix Figure 1. Irrigation development expenditures at 1975176 prices, 
Indonesia, 1969170-1993/94 
Year New System Swamp and Tidal Rehabilitation River and Flood Construction Control 
million Rupiah 
1969170 10,066 10,993 14,345 3,664 
1970171 7,739 10,739 13,331 1,527 
1971172 7,180 9,881 13,927 1,394 
1972/73 7,289 9,515 14,880 1,869 
1973174 6,024 8,917 17,229 1,446 
1974175 15,737 4,680 12,770 18,727 
1975176 27,387 15,736 19,684 35,445 
1976177 35,800 8,264 25,233 42,262 
1977178 46,983 9,942 33,913 50,040 
1978/79 59,807 11,445 47,133 61,340 
1979/80 63,020 13,787 47,414 56,178 
1980/81 72,297 13,518 52,830 50,442 
1981/82 75,941 10,034 59,608 55,682 
1982/83 81,387 11,595 58,274 47,744 
1983/84 65,370 5,633 45,237 27,138 
1984/85 50,791 12,518 63,777 58,849 
198S/86 77,416 8,871 48,129 46,839 
1986/87 57,440 4,940 21,355 28,373 
1987/88 60,733 6,141 21,687 42,285 
1988/89 34,211 2,720 14,747 20,208 
1989/90 100,988 13,245 52,257 86,902 
1990/91 113,676 13,840 48,623 82,999 
1991/92 107,971 8,918 63,857 59,403 
1992/93 125,258 21,766 48,037 66,314 
1993/94 127,160 11,915 59,631 81,982 
Appendix Figure 2. Area completed tmder irrigation development programs, 
Indonesia, 1969n0-1993/94 
Year New System Swamp and Tidal Rehabilitation River and Flood Construction Control 
million Rupiah 
1969/70 43,153 21,059 210,330 73,259 
1970171 24,379 25,000 171,549 62,406 
1971/72 46,400 14,905 134,754 57,045 
1972/73 45,834 61,562 172,444 55,875 
1973/74 31,480 56,140 263,469 40,853 
1974/75 20,684 8,154 108,956 79,278 
1975/76 88,522 34,368 105,143 140,122 
1976/77 63,435 26,190 116,893 114,934 
1977/78 41,157 27,246 112,015 130,484 
1978/79 112,144 83,244 84,833 148,907 
1979/80 122,541 71,226 95,133 139,984 
1980/81 113,124 117,321 111,803 137,079 
1981/82 118,006 108,690 94,413 141,037 
1982/83 57,128 124,024 69,142 121,005 
1983/84 25,391 33,244 24,160 39,363 
1984/85 48,000 60,500 43,560 61,200 
1985/86 44,100 33,400 29,040 54,500 
1986/87 43,700 4,800 24,700 34,100 
1987/88 40,100 16,600 34,400 72,100 
1988/89 22,000 5,000 20,000 34,000 
1989/90 102,849 135,144 171,714 73,637 
1990/91 83,455 43,912 236,852 78,284 
1991/92 77,309 60,365 262,075 118,266 
1992/93 64,182 n.a. 282,448 91,000 
1993/94 98,740 155,662 212,208 93,445 
Note: 1993/1994 data are targeted areas. 
n.a. = data not available. 
Source: DGWRD (1969-1994). 
